I didn’t like Basil Peters the first time I saw his name.
Basil’s book “Early Exits” had a huge display at the Books for Business store in downtown Toronto. I sheepishly asked the clerk if she had a copy of a book with a similar theme called “Built to Sell”. She looked puzzled and turned to her computer terminal to search the title.
“Sorry sir, we don’t seem to have that book”.
I left the store cursing this Basil Peters fellow.
Then, begrudgingly, I got to know Basil.
What I discovered was one of the smartest, most experienced en
trepreneurs I have ever met. Starting in school, he scaled a business up to a couple of hundred employees. He sold it and took his cash and invested in some start-ups. He promptly lost a bunch of his winnings but learned a lot in the process. He went on to be involved in a hundred or so deals –as an entrepreneur, angel, investor and/or advisor.
I’ve asked Basil to come to Las Vegas and spend a half day working with the 20 entrepreneurs selected for the Creating a Sellable Service Business Workshop on January 16 &17, 2012 (there are still a couple of spots if you’re interested – you can register here).
To give you a quick peek inside Basil’s mind, here’s a recent exchange between the two of us:
What exactly do you mean by an early exit?
There isn’t a precise definition. “Early exits” refers to a strong trend in the 21st century economy, driven by buyers who want to acquire companies in the $10 to 30 million range. With “internet acceleration,” entrepreneurs can often create values in that range just 2 or 3 years from startup. The combination of those values, and that timing, are what I think of as an early exit.
What are the telltale signs that a business (or entrepreneur) is ready for an early exit?
Exit timing is one of the things I wish I had done better in my first five or six exits. Now having watched about 100 exits reasonably closely, I am convinced that in the very large majority of situations, entrepreneurs wait too long to start working on their exit. They end up ‘riding it over the top’ and selling for much less than they could have. Or even worse, missing the optimum time often means the company never exits. This phenomenon has not been discussed very much and is something that I am working hard to illuminate for entrepreneurs and investors.
What are the signs that it is too early/soon to exit?
It’s actually relatively easy to tell if it’s too early. I think the best indicator is that the price isn’t high enough to satisfy the shareholders. And it’s reasonably easy to determine the price (within a reasonable range of certainty.)
A lot of business owners are planning to wait until the market for privately held businesses recovers, banks are willing to lend more aggressively, and multiples start going up again. Is it worth waiting?
In my opinion, that time is now. Interest rates are lower than they have been in our lifetime, the private equity funds are back, and the corporate acquirers are very receptive. With everything going on in Europe, I wouldn’t wait.
What if you have a really small business, maybe only $500,000 in revenue with some promising technology, should you still think about selling early?
I don’t think of it as a question of selling “early” or not. I believe it’s a matter of the best time to sell. Often the best time is well before the company is profitable or hits $1 million in revenue. Recently, Google said: “we prefer companies that are pre-revenue.” How’s that for early?
Can you explain the structure of the typical early exit? Are businesses owners walking away with a check or are they selling a part of their business to a private equity firm with hopes of taking a “second bite of the apple” in 3-5 years, or are you seeing a lot of earn-outs?
Most of the exits I see these days are all cash, or possibly cash with a portion of vendor financing. Buyers know that if they try to reduce risk with earn-out formulas or risky structures, the sellers will just go somewhere else. The problem for most buyers today is that they have too much cash. So if the transaction is fairly priced, the structures today tend to be cash, or ‘near cash.’
Once a business owner makes the decision to sell, what are some of the mistakes you see them make in approaching a transaction?
The most common mistakes I see are:
1. CEOs trying to do it themselves, and
2. Selecting the wrong M&A advisor (i-banker)
Do you believe in running an auction for a company, or do you try to negotiate with one strategic at a time?
I believe multiple bidders are always desirable. In some cases, that’s not possible or isn’t what the sellers want to do. But in my opinion, it’s almost always a good strategy.
What are the idiosyncrasies of selling a service business?
These days, in North America, almost every business is a service business, or has a large service component. Software as a service (SaaS), for example, is probably the hottest sector of the M&A market. Non-service businesses – in other words, manufacturing and asset businesses – are harder to sell today.
How does having money change your life?
I think it’s a little like having your first child. Everyone will tell you what it’s like, or what it was like for them. But until the reality is right there in front of you, it’s actually pretty hard to describe. For me, having money created a lot of freedom. I enjoyed it a lot and strongly recommend it to everyone.
What were the mistakes you made after your first exit that you would like to take back if you could?
That’s another easy one. I could tell a long story, but I think the most common mistake, and I certainly made it, is to go out and make two really bad investments. When I sold my first company, a couple of my friends in YPO warned me that was what most of us do. But like all good entrepreneurs, I ignored them. So I learned that lesson with an education that cost about 20 times more than my Ph.D.
Basil Peters will be leading a half-day session at my “Creating a Sellable Service Business” workshop on January 16&17, 2012 in Las Vegas. Register here.














